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Using Italian data in the period 1999-2002, we estimate the impact of
trials delay on the willingness to commit crimes against property. How-
ever, the endogenous relationship that links the former to the latter could
generate serious problems of inconsistency in the estimation procedure.
Since geographical distance can be considered an exogenous determinant
of the probability of belonging to peripheral courts, which are typically
considered less e¢ cient than main ones, it should represent a valid can-
didate instrument for trials delay. Estimates obtained by means of Two-
Stages Least Squares show a signi￿cant positive e⁄ect of trials duration on
crimes, supporting the hypothesis that some criminals are either sensitive
to the discounting process of punishment or aware of the probability of
prescription, or both. As a side result, we also ￿nd a relationship between
courts￿fragmentation and trials duration. This suggests that an optimal
dimension of courts is likely to exist, and that policy makers should take
this into consideration in the design of the jurisdictional geography.
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11 Introduction
Theoretical literature assesses that courts delays seriously undermine the de-
terrence e⁄ect of justice (M￿hl and Vereeck, 2000; Torre, 2003; Darley and
Robinson, 2003). In particular, dilution of the burden of sanctions in￿ icted
on criminals operates as a discounting factor attached to the expected cost of
punishments (Listokin, 2005).
This paper focuses on the empirical relationship between the excessive length
of criminal1 judicial procedures and crime rates in Italy. The reason why we
concentrate on Italy is that in several areas of this country trials and appeals fre-
quently last longer than prescription terms2, so that plenty of crimes ￿ especially
minor crimes￿ remain unpunished. These facts imply that the willingness to
commit illegal actions is particularly sensitive to trials duration, since the dis-
count factor represented by courts delays becomes negligible when the expected
time required to complete a judicial proceeding matches prescription terms3.
Using panel data from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT)
at a provincial4 level, we estimate the impact of trials and appeals delay on the
willingness to commit crimes against property, like thefts, robberies, racketeer-
ing and frauds.
In the period 1999-2002, our estimates show a signi￿cant positive e⁄ect of
the length of trials on these crimes, possibly validating the hypothesis that
certain types of illegal agents are concerned about discounting the burden of
punishment they must ￿ or sometimes only should￿ bear.
The choice of crimes against property is driven by the presumption that a
rational cost-bene￿t analysis is more likely to be carried out by o⁄enders before
undertaking their actions with respect to other types of crime. In fact, it is
widely assessed that monetary units of measurement for cost-bene￿t analysis
are a commonly accepted reference point for marginal utility units (Farrel and
1Despite in Italy the debate has been so far dealing with the ine¢ ciency of civil proceedings
(Marchesi 1998, among others), criminal ones normally take longer than in other countries to
be completed.
2This rule, which is not peculiar to Italy, states that a crime is considered like never been
committed if a judgement has not yet been pronounced within a certain period of time.
3Moreover, a recent reform introduces the reduction of prescription terms, thus exacerbat-
ing an already serious status of the Italian judicial environment.
4In Italy, a province is an administrative sub-division of a region, which is an administrative
sub-division of the state. A province consists of several administrative sub-divisions called
comune. The country was divided into 20 regions and 103 provinces at the time we collected
our data. As of 2006, there are 110 provinces.
2Roman, 2002).
In the case of crimes against property, bene￿ts can be easily converted into
consistent monetary units of analysis and compared to the cost of a ￿ne or of
time spent in jail. Conversely, for other types of crimes ￿ e. g. murders￿ it is
plausible that more irrational factors, like jealousy or madness, a⁄ect criminals￿
willingness to commit that speci￿c action. Here, bene￿ts should be represented
by the satisfaction obtained by killing someone other, which is almost impossible
to evaluate5.
The traditional literature on crime and punishment (Becker, 1968) states
that the rational willingness to commit a crime is inversely linked to some
institutional and judicial variables, such as the probability of detection, the
probability of conviction, and the punishment in￿ icted by the court. Following
Marselli and Vannini (1996), we compute these measures together with trials
and appeals duration and use them to predict crime rates.
However, estimating crime rates through judicial variables presumes their
perfect knowledge from the criminal￿ s standpoint. This might sound quite weird
for ordinary people carrying out their existence "legally". However, there is a
possible explanation for this to occur to actual and potential criminals.
In fact, it is widely known that people growing in highly illegal-prone areas
are more likely to become criminals as well (Krohn, 1986). Thus, crime is some-
how clustered for reasons due to bad living conditions, unemployment, insu¢ -
cient education, and lack of infrastructures (Chiricos, 1987; Power and Wilson,
2000; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001, to mention just a few). But informa-
tion can be clustered as well. Basically, people surrounded by criminal activities
are put in the condition to make inference on how and when the law prosecutes
their neighbors. They are frequently involved in talking concerning the sorts of
a substantial number of individuals who have committed crimes, while individ-
uals living outside the cluster cannot access this information. Therefore, crime
propensity and information acquisition may be endogenously generated.
Moreover, the presence of unmeasurable components that a⁄ect both judicial
variables and crime rates may also account for another form of endogeneity
5In addiction, there is a vast literature that assess the incapability of the maximum penalty
of reducing murders. In fact, an inverse correlation has been documented: when states abolish
death penalty a corresponding drop in capital crimes is reported (Pfohl, chapter 3, 1994, among
others). This indirectly state that the cost-bene￿t analysis plays no role in determining the
choice of committing murders.
3which is extremely relevant for our estimation purposes. The "ability" of judges
and a general attitude towards the compliance with rules are an example of
simultaneous determination of crimes and trials and appeals duration. Reverse
causality between dependent and independent variables is then a by-product of
endogeneity. In fact, on the one hand, it may be that trials duration a⁄ects
crime rates due to underdeterrence. On the other hand, it is also possible that
a higher number of proceedings induces courts￿delay.
Due to these issues, facing our objective by means of standard Least Squared
estimation techniques would provide spurious results. In order to solve this prob-
lem, we use an instrumental variable approach, choosing instruments that are
correlated to trials and appeals delay but not to unmeasurable factors deter-
mining crime rates.
Basing on the conventional wisdom that peripheral courts are less e¢ cient
than main ones (Senate of the Italian Republic, 2002) at a ￿rst glance a variable
￿ typically a dummy￿ that tells whether a court is peripheral seems a candidate
instrument for trials and appeals delay. However, peripheral courts are created
with the aim of reducing main courts￿ workload and are often placed right
where judicial proceedings last longer than elsewhere. This implies some degree
of endogeneity for this kind of instrument. Hence, we use exogenous proxies
for the probability that peripheral courts are set along with main ones in some
areas of the country.
These exogenous variables are represented by measures of distance between
minor towns and the main city of a certain geographical district. In fact, dis-
tance from the main courts is one of the most frequent reasons why new periph-
eral ones are created. Distance determines ￿ and is not determined by￿ the
probability of belonging to a peripheral district and should not be correlated
with unmeasurable components, like the ability of judges and compliance with
rules.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
illustrate criminality rates in Italy, in Section 3 we analyze the state of justice
and the problems associated to courts delay, and in Section 4 we describe the
dataset in detail. In Section 5 and 6 we concentrate on the estimation procedures
followed in the econometric analysis and discuss possible causes of endogeneity
and available instruments. Finally, section 7 exposes the results, and Section 8
4concludes.
2 Criminal Issues in Italy
Measuring crime rates has long been a puzzling issue (O￿ Brien et al., 1980),
since often injured do not formally report facts to judicial authorities, and even
sometimes report facts that never occurred or do not properly correspond to
crimes. This is particularly true for crimes against property6.
However, all through our analysis we assume that these two events compen-
sate (Dalla Pellegrina et al., 2005) and that the number of crimes reported to
the corresponding authority re￿ ects on average a correct ranking of crime rates
in Italian provinces.
Crimes against property represent a share of 73.47 per cent on the overall
number of injuries. Italian data are almost in line with those of other developed
countries, such as US and Canada (Marselli and Vannini, 1999).
However, looking at international statistics, it is not di¢ cult to realize that
in this country the situation has deeply deteriorated in relatively recent times,
starting from the late Eighties.
In particular, in the decade 1990-2000, despite the growth rate of the pop-
ulation has been 0.17 per cent, crimes against property increased at a rate of
19.39 per cent8.
These data justify some sort of social warning perceived by the population,
which is also reported by media and surveys (Multiscope Analysis on Italian
Households9).
6Think about rarely denounced cellular phones thefts. Or again, often people are not sure
wether someone stole their wallet or they simply lost it. They go to the police, but they may
report incorrect events.
7Percentages refer to the period of time considered in the empirical analysis (1999-2002).
See next section for further details.
8Data are provided by the Italian Ministry of Justice and ISTAT.
9This is a survey carried out by the Italian National Institute of Statistics in the period
1987-1991 on a sample of about 24,000 households.
53 Trials and Appeals Delay
Pending proceedings have risen to almost 9 millions in the last few years in
Italy, two thirds of them belonging to the criminal sector, while the remaining
are civil ones. Considering that this country has a population of about 57
millions inhabitants, these ￿gures are simply astonishing.
Trials and appeals delay and the large stock of pending proceedings are one
of the major problems associated to the ine¢ ciency of justice. If one thinks
about criminal proceeding that evolve through some preliminary investigation,
a preliminary hearing, then a ￿rst and ￿ in some cases￿ a second instance, their
computed average length is more than 4.5 years (Attorney General, Supreme
Court, 2005).
According to the ISTAT, the length of criminal proceedings has now more
than doubled as compared to the length registered in the Seventies, showing a
deep critical situation around the mid Eighties.
The fact that crime rates boosted right after the sharp increase of trials
duration leaves much to consider about the causal relationship going from the
latter to the former.
As we already mentioned, it might be that a very long trial postpones the
timing of punishment and this could be an important factor inducing people to
take on more criminal actions.
Furthermore, when judicial proceedings reach abnormal delays, the proba-
bility of exploiting prescription principles in order to avoid punishment becomes
considerably high, thus increasing the willingness to commit crimes. Such be-
havior may eventually exacerbate the alarming situation of the judicial appa-
ratus. Under these circumstances, trials and appeals duration ends up to be
endogenously determined.
A recent Italian reform nourishes the vicious circle described above. Basi-
cally it consists in the reduction of prescription terms associated to some types
of crimes, including those against property. Perhaps with the aim of cutting
the burden of proceedings pending on courts and speeding up a huge stock of
judicial proceedings, the legislator did not su¢ ciently take into consideration
that in some circumstances these provisions might end up with a boomerang ef-
fect, meaning a substantial dissolution of the deterrence purpose of justice and
a higher incentive to commit crimes.
6For example, crimes that are punished with jail until ￿ve or six years10
￿ such as thefts, corruption, and usury￿ were before associated to a prescrip-
tion of 15 years, while according to the law mentioned above they prescribe in
7.5 years, a phenomenon that is expected to dramatically rise the number of
unpunished crimes.
It is worth to observe that in 1999 about 113,000 crimes fell into prescription
in Italy, then jumping to 151,000 in 2002, and it is not di¢ cult to guess that
they will de￿nitely boost as a consequence of the reduction of terms (Attorney
General, Supreme Court, 2005).
Moreover, the disastrous situation of jails in this country leaves no room
to further push on repression devices, but rather suggests devoting much e⁄ort
toward various instruments of prevention and deterrence in order to cope with
the problem of micro-criminality .
Finally, an ine¢ cient justice contributes to decrease trustworthiness toward
the legal apparatus. More e¢ cient courts would instead encourage a stronger
respect for judicial sentences, perhaps also inducing a lower number of people
lodging an appeal and reduce the overall delays. This phenomenon would release
new resources which might be eventually diverted toward those divisions where
they are mostly required.
4 Data
Data have been collected yearly for the period 1999-2002 on all (103) Italian
provinces for a total of 412 observations.
In the period considered in our analysis, the average number of crimes11
every 1,000 inhabitants is 50.69, where 37.21 (73.4 per cent) are crimes against
property (Table 1). Among this category, 28.11 are thefts, 0.93 are robberies,
3.31 and 0.13 are respectively frauds and racketeering (4.73 are damages to
things and animals, which are not accounted for by our analysis).
Figures A1-A4 in the Appendix ￿ representing crimes against property every
1,000 inhabitants across the provinces of Italy in 1999-2002￿ show another
10Prescription is correlated with the maximum punishment settled by the law for any type
of crime.
11These are crimes for which the Judicial Authority has started a legal action.
7peculiar feature related to their impact on di⁄erent areas of the country. In
fact, thefts and robberies spread throughout the Northern provinces following a
track that goes from the North-West to the Mid-East (Figures A1 and A2), while
racketeering and frauds are more speci￿c to the Southern provinces (Figures A3
and A4).
Moreover, it seems that thefts and frauds are a typical phenomenon of larger,
richer and highly populated towns. Therefore, priors ￿ frequent in Italy￿
concerning the exclusive presence of crime in the Southern regions need to be
taken cautiously and even partially ruled out (see Marselli and Vannini, 1999).
Crimes in Italy are instead jeopardized. It seems that within the same
region there are virtuous provinces and others very badly performing, a fact
that necessarily requires crime data that are disaggregated at a provincial level
in order to carry out a sound econometric analysis.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
We measure the ine¢ ciency of courts with the length12 of trials and appeals.
Preliminary investigation is included in trials duration. In Table 2 are reported
the length of both stages of the judicial proceeding.
Data show that trials last on average 2.96 years. If we add the average length
of the appeal (1.73 years) the cumulative length reaches 4.69 years.
Furthermore, it emerges that the probability of lodging an appeal, computed
as the ratio of proceedings accruing to the Court of Appeals to total trials, is
quite high (27 per cent).
Table A2 reports descriptive statistics on the length of trials and appeals in
di⁄erent areas of the country. As expected, there is evidence for an ine¢ cient
situation of many ￿rst instance Southern courts. Conversely high appeals delay
concerns courts located in the Northern and Central part of the country.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
As we discussed above, if criminals are su¢ ciently informed, trial delays
should stimulate in particular those crimes that involve a rational cost-bene￿t
12For the computation of trials duration see Marselli and Vannini, 1999, Chapter 7.
8analysis before being carried out. However, even if such an analysis is supposed
to be conducted, it is also possible that other standard factors (￿ la Becker),
like the probability of detection and conviction, and the burden of punishment,
are going to a⁄ect this rational calculus.
Following Marselli and Vannini (1996), for each type of crime considered in
the econometric analysis, we use the ratio of crimes with unknown author over
the overall number of crimes to measure the probability of avoiding detection.
Hence, the probability of detection for crime x, where x can be either theft,
robbery, racketeering or fraud, is computed as follows:
Probability of detectionx = 1 ￿
number of crimesx with unknown author
total number of crimesx
(1)
Table 3 reports that the highest probability of detection occurs for racke-
teering (55 per cent), followed by frauds (36 per cent), robberies (11 per cent),
and thefts (6 per cent).
We also use the number of guilty sentences pronounced over the total num-
ber of crimes by known authors in order to take account of the probability of
conviction:
Probability of convictionx =
number of guilty sentences on crimex
number of crimesx with known author
(2)
The highest probability of conviction (see again Table 3) is for robberies (79
per cent), followed by thefts (76 per cent), racketeering (49 per cent) and frauds
(8 per cent).
Moreover, we assume that the average time spent in jail represents the pun-
ishment in￿ icted to guilty fellows:
Punishmentx = average months of jail for crimex (3)
The dimension of punishments seems to re￿ ect crime seriousness. In fact,
more violent ones are associated with a higher number of months of jail, while
crimes that involve a pure damage on property are more softly punished. Ac-
cording to our data the highest punishment is in￿ icted for robberies (24.8
9months) and racketeering (24.9, but with a higher standard deviation as com-
pared to robberies), followed by frauds (6.6 months) and thefts (4.9 months).
The probability of in￿ icting ￿nes is also included as a regressor. The highest
probability of paying ￿nes occurs for racketeering (31 per cent), followed by
thefts (8 per cent), frauds (0.6 per cent), and robberies (0.6 per cent).
[Insert Table 3 about here]
As we mentioned above, economic and social features, like unemployment
and income should be risk factors that more likely induce individuals to commit
crimes.
Unemployment rate, which dramatically increases going from the Northern
to the Southern regions of the country13, is considered one of the main factors
pushing people, and especially young individuals, toward apparently attractive
illegal activities.
Per-capita income (typically higher in Northern provinces) should also be
positively correlated with some crimes, and the reason might be that criminals
select their operational places also according to the amount of resources that
they can appropriate14. Furthermore, per-capita income and unemployment
might help explaining the impact of the economic cycle on crime. We also add
square terms in order to capture possible nonlinearities in these variables.
However, other features might as well explain the incentive to commit crimes
against property, like the low availability of credit. In fact, borrowing could help
individuals starting some economic activity instead of raising money illegally.
Data on the amount of bank loans and subsidized credit are provided by the
Bank of Italy.
Lack of education, measured by high school dropout rates, may also be
positively correlated with crime rates. Moreover, we include the presence of the
public sector using the index of infrastructures computed by ISTAT15.
13On average in the period 1999-2002 the unemployment rate is less than 4.6 in the North-
West, 4.0 per cent in the North-East, 7.1 in the Center, and 18.4 per cent in the South (data
are provided by ISTAT).
14It is even possible that a higher income also implies its greater concentration. In this case,
inequalities increase the incentive for illegal appropriation (Fajnzylber et al., 2002).
15see www.istat.it for details on computation of this index. This variable is available only
at a regional level .
10Finally, we account for population density in each province16.
All descriptive statistics concerning the variables used in the empirical analy-
sis are reported in the Appendix.
5 Estimation
We estimate the following equation:
yit = ￿0 + ￿i + x0
EX it￿it + x0
EN it￿it + "it (4)
where yit represents the number of crimes every 1,000 inhabitants in every
province i at time t; x0
EX it is a vector of exogenous explanatory variables de-
scribed in the previous section; x0
EN it is a vector of endogenous explanatory
variables (identi￿ed as the length of trials and appeals); ￿i is a provincial
speci￿c e⁄ect; and ￿0 represents a constant term. The last component is an
idiosyncratic shock, "it s IID(0;￿2
").
We try both ￿xed and random e⁄ects speci￿cations. As it is standard in the
panel data literature (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998), the ￿rst technique allows
the speci￿c individual e⁄ects ￿i to be correlated with other regressors, while the
second technique assumes that the ￿i are randomly distributed with zero mean
and constant variance, ￿i s IID(0;￿2
￿), and independent from the regressors17.
However, due to the endogenous nature of x0
EN it, the parameters included
in ￿it would not be consistent if estimated via OLS. Hence, we run a previous
auxiliary step where x0
EN it is regressed on all other factors plus the vector of
exogenous instruments x0
it (see next session for details on the variables included
in this vector). Therefore, our instrumental variables speci￿cation becomes:
16Immigration could also be signi￿cant in explaining crime propensity. However, it is doc-
umented (Ministry of the Interior) that the most part of crimes committed by immigrants
concerns illegal ones. Obviously, data on illegal immigrants are not available. Moreover, im-
migrants are often located in larger towns and highly populated areas. Hence, our measure
of population density should be able to capture the e⁄ect of immigration.
17Hausman tests compare ￿xed and random e⁄ects speci￿cations. Statistics are reported
at the bottom of each table in section 7. Since all tests reject the hypothesis of the absence
of correlation between provincial speci￿c e⁄ects and the error term, we only report estimates
obtained with a ￿xed-e⁄ects model.
11xEN it = ￿0 + ￿i + x0
EX it￿it + z0
it￿it + ￿it (5)
yit = ￿0 + ￿i + x0
EX it￿it + b x0
EN it￿it + "it (6)
where b x0




Since xEN it can be either trials or appeals duration, the equations in the
system (5-6) are actually three for each type of crime. Hence, we try two
alternative estimation techniques. The ￿rst (Model 1) separately estimates all
equations in each crime￿system, while the second (Model 2) jointly estimates
trials and appeals duration.
6 Causes of Endogeneity and Available Instru-
ments
An immediate signal of the endogenous nature the main explanatory variables
in our model is easily identi￿able through possible reverse causality between
judicial delays and crime rates. As we already mentioned, our goal is to check
whether trial delays have some role in increasing the willingness to commit
crimes.
However, problems arise form the fact that a high number of crimes may
contemporaneously boost the stock of trials and appeals accruing to courts
and reduce the speed of justice. More speci￿cally, endogeneity arises due to
the presence of non-measurable factors a⁄ecting both the dependent and some
independent variables18.
One of such factors is likely to be the variance of punishments. It is possible
that, for the same crime, we observe more precise punishments in some courts
and more volatile ones in others. However, although expected punishments are
measurable ￿ by years of jail or ￿nes for each speci￿c crime￿ their variance is
not.
18This is like saying that one is not estimating a reduced form of a crime equation, but she
is trying to estimate a structural one. This induces a violation of OLS basic hypothesis of
estimation, i.e. the absence of correlation between independent variables and the error term
in the estimated equation. See Cameron and Trivedi (1998) for further details.
12On the one hand, the perception of a high variance of punishments might
a⁄ect the willingness of committing crimes depending on people￿ s attitude to-
wards risk (Lee and McCrary, 2005). In particular, if criminals are risk loving
(Becker, 1968), they will prefer highly volatile punishments.
On the other hand, the variance of punishments can be part of what can be
loosely de￿ned as the "ability" of judges. This may a⁄ect courts delays, since
it is possible that good judges are also faster in releasing verdicts. Thus, if the
variance of punishments is correlated to both crime propensity and the length
of judicial proceedings, the latter becomes endogenous (Vietti 2005).
Moreover, as Buscaglia and Dakolias (1996) observe, a higher variation in
times required by judges on similar cases tends to go hand in hand with cor-
ruption. In fact, courts delays together with a lack of enforceable standards
applied to times to disposition to judges, induces the latter and court sta⁄ to
charge "higher prices" either to speed up the proceeding, or to slow it down
(in case one requires some additional time to fall under prescription). Hence,
the variance of trials and appeals duration could also capture some degree of
corruption, which is clearly correlated to crime.
Another factor a⁄ecting both trial delays and crime rates can be a general
attitude toward compliance with rules. For example, citizens living in some
areas of the country might be more likely to comply with the law and commit a
reduced number of crimes. At the same time, if they get involved in a lawsuit it
is also more likely that they accept the verdict and do not appeal. This attitude
provides a lower amount of second instance proceedings and perhaps consequent
few delays.
In order to provide instruments that are not correlated to the error term in
equation (5) ￿ but help predicting the expected value of courts delays￿ we rely
on the conventional wisdom that peripheral courts are less e¢ cient than main
ones. This argument bases on the fact that these courts are too small to achieve
su¢ cient scale economies as main ones (Marchesi, 2003). Moreover, they may
also su⁄er from the scarce presence of best judges and courts￿sta⁄ who may be
more willing to operate in larger courts.
We de￿ne a peripheral ￿rst instance court a court that is not located in the
main town of a provincial district. By the same token, we de￿ne a peripheral
13Court of Appeals a court that is not located in the main city of the region19.
However, a dummy variable that measures whether a court is a main or a
peripheral one cannot be used in order to instrument trials and appeals delay.
The reason relies again on endogeneity, since the fact of placing new courts
in some areas of the country might be driven by high delays in those districts
(Senate of the Italian Republic, 2004).
Hence, we use the distance between the main town of each province and the
main Court of Appeals of the region in order to capture the probability that the
province belongs to a peripheral judicial district. We also use the dimension of
each provincial district in order to account for the probability that peripheral
￿rst instance courts are located in that district.
In fact, one of the reasons why minor courts have been set in certain areas
of the country is to reduce discomfort for people and lawyers living far from
the main ones (Senate of the Italian Republic, 2002). Moreover, distance and
province areas are exogenous measures with respect to crime rates. Hence, they
should represent appropriate instruments for, respectively, appeals and trials
duration 20.
The area of each provincial district is indeed positively correlated (34.01 per
cent) to the number of ￿rst instance courts placed in that district. Similarly,
the distance of each province from the main town of the region is positively
correlated (54.25 per cent) to the fact of belonging to a peripheral Court of
Appeals.
Finally, it would be useful to adopt the rate of proceedings accruing to the
Courts of Appeals to instrument appeals delay21. The idea is that when the
rate of appeal is large, second instance courts slow down their job due to the
19First Instance Courts are located in the main town of the province, while Courts of Appeals
are located in the main town of the region (only the region of Valle d￿ Aosta, which belongs
to the Court of Appeal of Torino, is an exception). However, in Italy there are 10 additional
sub-regional courts of Appeals (three of them are detached sections of other courts) and 62
additional sub-provincial First Instance Courts which are settled out of the main towns.
20Judges remuneration and thir career concerns could also represent valid instruments for
trials delay (Schneider, 2005). However, these information is not available for all Italian
judicial districts, particularly at a ￿rst instance level.
21This could be endogenous for ￿rst instance delays. In fact, even if a ￿rst instance sentence
can interrupt prescription, the overall length of a proceeding (from the day the crime has been
committed until the ￿nal sentence) cannot exceed the term indicated by the law for each crime
plus a pre-determined share of this term (generally a half). Thus, if a ￿rst instance trial lasts
long, it is possible that it induces a higher incentive to try and bet on prescription in the
Appeal in order to exhaust the overall time available for judges to pronounce the ￿nal verdict.
14high number of proceedings at hand. However, the rate of appeal could again
be correlated to unmeasurable determinants of crime, such as the ability of
judges and general compliance with Courts of Appeals￿sentences. Hence, our
exogenous measure of the presence of peripheral (perceived as more ine¢ cient)
￿rst intance courts might help explaining second instance delays through an
increasing rate of appeal22. Hence it seems plausible to use use the complete
vector of our instruments in each duration regression to capture possible cross-
e⁄ects.
7 Results
Estimation results are presented in Tables 4-823. The second and third column
of each table report estimates obtained via Model 1 (all equations are separately
estimated) and Model 2 (trials and appeals duration equations are jointly esti-
mated) respectively24.
Predictions concerning the positive impact of trial duration on crime rates
seem to hold, at least as far as ￿rst instance is concerned. In fact, ￿rst instance
delays are always positive and signi￿cant in explaining the number of crimes
against property in the Italian framework.
Parameters associated to ￿rst instance delays in the equation for thefts (Ta-
ble 5) and robberies (Table 6) are 5.25 and 0.22 respectively25 with 1 per cent
level of con￿dence. Estimates suggest that a one-year additional delay implies
5.24 more thefts every 100,000 inhabitants, which means 18 per cent increase in
thefts and 23 per cent increase in robberies26.
22The idea is that, when trials register abnormal delays, punishment could be less precise.
Many factors can drive this outcome. For example, judges misrecall past information (Sherrod,
1985), they get retired and other (less informed) take their place, documents might be lost,
etc. In this case of either victims or o⁄enders may end up to be unsatis￿ed with sentences.
This may induce a higher probability of appealing.
23Each table reports outputs for the Hausman test performed comparing ￿xed and random
e⁄ects estimation techniques. Hausman always rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation
between ￿xed e⁄ects and the error at 1 and 5 per cent level of con￿dence.
24We also tried di⁄erent speci￿cations. In particular, we excluded observations relative to
two autonomous provinces (Bolzano and Aosta) that have di⁄erent ethnic origins. However,
results remain almost unchanged in terms of parameters magnitude and standard errors.
25These are averages computed from Models 1 and 2.
26This represents the computed ratio between average estimated parameters and per capita
thefts in the period 1999-2002.
15First instance delays positively a⁄ect frauds (Table 7) and racketeering (Ta-
ble 8) as well, although with a lower level of signi￿cance (10 and 5 per cent
respectively). Increasing delay by one year implies 11 per cent increase in the
former type of crime and 19 per cent increase in the latter.
Conversely, the duration of appeals seems not to play any role in determin-
ing crime rates. The reason might be that people involved in micro-crimes do
not often reach the appeal judgement stage. Or it is even possible that those for
crimes against property are, in most cases, such small punishments ￿ as com-
pared to the expenditure required to access an appeal￿ that convicted prefer
to accept sentences and abstain from going further. It might also be the case
that, due to prescription rules, criminals are not concerned about the appeal
duration because ￿rst instance delays are enough to prescribe their actions.
The probability of detection is instead a very important component for the
determination of the willingness to commit thefts and robberies, but it is not
meaningful as far as racketeering and frauds are concerned. This path suggests
that criminals are more aware of a marginal increase in the probability of being
caught when this is lower.
This phenomenon should be quite intuitive. In fact, thinking in terms of
marginal costs and bene￿ts of committing illegal actions, a marginal increase in
the probability of detection when this is low (see Table 3) has a stronger impact
on the willingness to commit a crime than the same marginal increase occurring
in case of a high probability of detection.
Probability of conviction is acts a deterrent for every type of crime, except for
robberies. The sign of the relationship between this crime and the probability
of conviction is negative anyway (Table 6) and standard errors as well are not
disproportionately high.
An interesting feature is that punishment, represented by the number of
months of jail, seems not to a⁄ect the willingness to commit crimes. In fact,
this variable is not signi￿cant in almost all cases. An exception is represented
by racketeering, where the parameter is positive27.
27However, this result might be partially driven by endogeneity. In fact, when a certain
crime is very widespread in some area, judges tend to be relatively more severe with those
committing it. This evidence emerges from our data. For example, racketing, which is a typical
crime occurring in the Southern regions is punished with 29 months of jail in the South, while
months are 22 in the North. However, due to the paucity of available instruments we could
not treat punishment as endogenous in our estimates.
16The probability of in￿ icting ￿nes is never signi￿cant in determining the will-
ingness to commit crimes. This suggests that ￿nes are perhaps not an e⁄ective
instrument of deterrence, possibly in view of the fact that micro-crimes are gen-
erally committed by relatively poor individuals with scarce options in terms
of income ￿ ows and employment possibilities and that consequently cannot be
expropriated. However, when criminals are likely to be richer, as in the case of
frauds, the mechanism of application of ￿nes is close to be e⁄ective28.
Social and economic variables also provide interesting insights. The unem-
ployment rate, conditional on other controls, has a positive impact only on
the incentive to commit thefts, suggesting that this crime tends to spread over
poor settlements where the labor market does not grant the opportunity of a
continuous income ￿ ow.
Net per-capita income of each province shows the other side of the story,
that is an augmenting presence of crimes against property where people can
assure higher rents to illegality. This relationship holds in the case of all crimes
but racketeering. Frauds are instead the most sensitive to higher incomes29.
Bank deposits, which may represent a stock measure of wealth, show the
same path of income, at least as far as thefts and robberies are concerned. An
interesting evidence is instead the strong reduction of robberies and, to a lesser
extent thefts, where facilitated credit is more available. This has clear impli-
cations in terms of the e⁄ectiveness of promoting policies that reduce interest
rates spreads between Northern and Southern regions of the country30.
Estimates for the index of infrastructures are ￿ although weakly￿ signi￿-
cant and negative in explaining thefts and robberies, indicating that the presence
of the public sector can actually play a role in reducing the rate of criminality.
However, the impact of this variable on crime rates should be taken cautiously
due to possible endogeneity. In fact, on the one hand, the level of infrastruc-
tures may induce higher welfare and consequent lower criminality. On the other
hand, there may be some unexplained factor (corruption, for example) that is
correlated to both infrastructures and crimes, and which gives biased estimates
28As opposite to what occurs for other types of crimes, the standard errors associated to
￿nes in Table 7 are quite below the estimated parameters.
29Moreover, income is also a good proxy of the rate of illegal immigration. However, data
are available for legal immigrants only and are highly correlated with income. For reasons of
collinearity with this variable immigration has not been included among the regressors.
30Interest rates di⁄erentials of 3 percentage points were not di¢ cult to observe during the
period of our analysis.
17for the impact of the former on the latter.
Almost all types of crimes are not sensitive to population density. We ex-
pected that people living in major towns and highly populated areas were those
subject to the highest risk of being involved as victims of crimes. However, our
estimates suggest that income ￿ and not population density, which is positively
correlated to income￿ captures all the signi￿cance in the explanation of crime
rates. High school dropout rates are instead nowhere signi￿cant.
In Table 4 we report estimates of the ￿rst stage Least Squares31. Here some-
thing interesting emerges from the role of instrumental variables in determining
trials and appeals duration.
In the upper part of the table, we observe that our exogenous proxy of the
presence of peripheral ￿rst instance courts increases trials duration and has no
signi￿cant e⁄ect on appeals. This result is in line with the statement that smaller
peripheral courts cannot achieve su¢ cient scale economies and/or bene￿t less
from knowledge spillovers that are instead frequent in larger courts.
Conversely (see the lower part of the table), our proxy of the presence of
peripheral Courts of Appeals reduces appeals duration32. Here, the positive
e⁄ects deriving from increasing the number of second instance courts33 ￿ and
consequently reducing their dimension￿ suggests that larger courts may also
su⁄er dimensional problems. These, for example, can be due to scarce monitor-
ing on sta⁄￿ s work and an excess of organizational tasks that drive judges far
from their jurisdictional activity (Senate of the Italian Republic, 2002).
Furthermore (see again the lower part of Table 4) our exogenous measure
of the presence of peripheral ￿rst intance courts induces higer second instance
delays. As we discussed above, this phenomenon seem to operate through an
increasing rate of appeal which originates from a general unsatisfaction produced
by excessive trials delays.
Finally, combining the results mentioned above we can conclude that there
31Sargan statistics have been computed to jointly test the hypothesis of correct model
speci￿cation and validity of instruments. Results support our choice of exogenous measures
of distance and area in order to avoid possibly inconsistent estimates.
32This is not incompatible with the fact that peripheral courts of Appeal are less e¢ cient
than main ones in a given region. What is likely to occur is that peripheral Courts of Appeal
tend to reduce total workload for main courts, with the ￿nal result of lowering average trial
duration in those regions where they are set up.
33This is also suggested by Buscaglia and Ulen (1997) in the case of Latin American coun-
tries.
18are pros and cons in increasing the number of courts and reducing their dimen-
sion. In other words, there should be an optimal court dimension that balances
these e⁄ects. At the moment, as far as ￿rst instance courts are concerned, cons
overcome pros, while the opposite occurs in the appeal.
[Insert Tables 4 ￿ 8 about here]
8 Conclusions
In this paper we empirically estimated the impact of trials and appeals duration
on some types of crimes which cause damages to property, like thefts, robberies,
racketeering and frauds. Those on property are the most part of crimes com-
mitted and typically are subject to lower punishment relatively to more violent
crimes.
As compared to other countries, Italy is going towards a situation where
those who are considered "minor crimes" are going to disproportionately in-
crease due to the presence of a vicious circle between judicial delays and incen-
tives to commit crimes.
Furthermore, the legislative process currently taking place in this country
(i.e. the reduction of prescription terms, which are proportional to the severity
of punishment), implies that the willingness to commit crimes is particularly
sensitive to trial duration, since the discount factor attached to punishment
becomes negligible when the expected time required to complete a judicial pro-
ceeding is higher than prescription terms.
Being concerned with the possible endogenous nature of trials and appeals
delay, we implemented estimates where instrumental variables help disentan-
gling reverse causality problems. In particular, we use exogenous measures of
distance in order to capture the probability that some districts fall under the
jurisdiction of peripheral courts, which are often considered less e¢ cient than
main ones.
In the period 1999-2002, estimates of the impact of the average length of tri-
als in Italy show a signi￿cant positive e⁄ect on crimes against property, possibly
validating the hypothesis that some ￿ rational￿ criminals are either sensitive
19to the discounting process of the burden of punishment or aware of the high
probability of prescription, or both. As opposite, according to our results, pun-
ishment per se is rarely signi￿cant.
As a side-result, we also ￿nd that there are negative e⁄ects in terms of trials
duration from an excessive fragmentation of ￿rst instance courts, while the
opposite occurs in the appeal. This indicates that there is possibly an optimal
dimension of courts, which policy makers should take into consideration while
designing the jurisdictional geography of the Country.
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Length of Trials and Rate of Proceedings Accruing to the  


















2.96 1.07 0.92  7.10 
 















† Ratio between the number of proceedings accruing to the Court of Appeals and the number 
of trials extinguished 
 
































Crimes Against Property: 37.21   73.4      
Thefts 28.11   55.5 11.90 1.41  74.81 
Robberies    0.93   1.8 0.55 0.07  5.39 
Frauds    3.31   6.5 1.29 0.79  12.77 
Racketeering    0.13   0.3 0.11 0.01  0.91 
(Others) 
 
  (4.73)   (9.3)    
 

























      










robberies  0.27 0.11 0.05 0.71 





















robberies  0.79 0.26 0.28 2.00 





















robberies  24.75 3.42  16.90 31.37 





















robberies  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 






























Province area (th. Kmq)  0.316**  0.314** 
 (0.144)  (0.124) 
Distance from the main town in the region (Km)  -0.006  -0.006 
 (0.010)  (0.008) 















Province area (th. Kmq)  0.542*  0.546* 
 (0.289)  (0.291) 
Distance from the main town in the region (Km)  -0.003**  -0.003** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 





Standard errors in parentheses  
significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant 
at 1% level 


















Model 2 †† 
Length of trials (1st instance)  5.054***  5.426*** 
 (1.580)  (1.683) 
Length of trials (Appeal)  -11.736  -14.078 
 (11.673)  (12.453) 
Probability of detection -83.630***  -83.754*** 
 (9.839)  (9.834) 
Probability of conviction -2.580***  -2.562*** 
 (0.916)  (0.912) 
Years of jail  -0.444  -0.439 
 (0.775)  (0.774) 
Probability of fine  3.023  2.989 
 (4.699)  (4.681) 
Unemployment 115.355*  122.831** 
 (60.525)  (61.666) 
Unemployment^2 -3.250*  -3.566* 
 (1.827)  (1.896) 
Per capita income  3.837**  4.022** 
 (1.836)  (1.856) 
Per capita income^2  -0.101**  -0.109** 
 (0.045)  (0.047) 
Facilitated credit  -10.020*
  -11.111* 
 (5.643)  (5.905) 
Per capita bank deposits  -0.694  -0.673 
 (0.792)  (0.793) 
School dropout rate  -0.502  -0.575 
 (0.433)  (0.447) 
Degree of infrastructures  -62.307*  -66.126 
 (36.469)  (36.994) 
Population density  0.012  0.006 
 (0.045)  (0.046) 
Constant 31.262  36.066 
 (29.144)  (30.164) 
Observations 412  412 
R-squared 0.84  0.84 
 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
†   Hausman chi2(14) = 23.75   Sargan   chi2 (2)=3.060   
†† Hausman chi2(14) = 24.07   Sargan   chi2 (2)=3.345   
















Model 2 †† 
Length of trials (1st instance)  0.206***  0.229*** 
 (0.043)  (0.045) 
Length of trials (Appeal)  0.863  -1.013 
 (0.821)  (0.941) 
Probability of detection  -0.257**  -0.251** 
 (0.116)  (0.116) 
Probability of conviction  -0.041  -0.040 
 (0.045)  (0.044) 
Years of jail  -0.002  -0.002 
 (0.004)  (0.004) 
Probability of fine  0.119  0.133 
 (2.542)  (2.532) 
Unemployment 2.023  2.500 
 (1.596)  (1.621) 
Unemployment^2 -0.110**  -0.130*** 
 (0.048)  (0.050) 
Per capita income  0.104**  0.114* 
 (0.046)  (0.046) 
Per capita incombe^2  -0.003***  -0.004*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
Facilitated credit  -0.519***  -0.589*** 
 (0.150)  (0.157) 
Per capita bank deposits  0.035*  0.036* 
 (0.020)  (0.020) 
School dropout rate  -0.042***  -0.046*** 
 (0.011)  (0.012) 
Degree of infrastructures  -1.978*  -2.226** 
 (1.046)  (1.054) 
Population density  -0.001  -0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
Constant 2.102***  2.419*** 
 (0.784)  (0.808) 
Observations 412  412 
R-squared 0.95  0.95 
 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level  
†   Hausman chi2(14) = 44.03   Sargan  chi2 (2)=1.255      
†† Hausman chi2(14) = 44.67   Sargan  chi2 (2)=1.459      
















Model 2 †† 
Length of trials (1st instance)  0.372*  0.366* 
 (0.197)  (0.210) 
Length of trials (Appeal)  0.965  1.006 
 (1.068)  (1.168) 
Probability of detection  -0.576  -0.580 
 (0.461)  (0.461) 
Probability of conviction -4.762***  -4.747*** 
 (1.623)  (1.622) 
Years of jail  -0.085  -0.085 
 (0.052)  (0.052) 
Probability of fine  7.058  7.010 
 (4.690)  (4.686) 
Unemployment 11.053  10.924 
 (7.565)  (7.712) 
Unemployment^2 -0.223  -0.218 
 (0.226)  (0.235) 
Per capita income  1.279***  1.277*** 
 (0.221)  (0.224) 
Per capita income^2  -0.028***  -0.028*** 
 (0.005)  (0.006) 
Facilitated credit  0.366  0.385 
 (0.710)  (0.744) 
Per capita bank deposits  0.061  0.061 
 (0.097)  (0.097) 
School dropout rate  -0.050  -0.049 
 (0.054)  (0.056) 
Degree of infrastructures  -3.292  -3.206 
 (4.692)  (4.761) 
Population density  0.005  0.005 
 (0.006)  (0.006) 
Constant -13.954***  -14.059*** 
 (3.667)  (3.802) 
Observations 412  412 
R-squared 0.79  0.79 
 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
†   Hausman chi2(14) = 30.91  Sargan  chi2(2)= 4.262   
†† Hausman chi2(14) = 31.00  Sargan  chi2(2)= 4.035   














Model 1 † 
 
 
Model 2 †† 
 
Length of trials (1st instance)  0.025**  0.025** 
 (0.011)  (0.012) 
Length of trials (Appeal)  -0.049  -0.048 
 (0.059)  (0.064) 
Probability of detection  -0.023  -0.023 
 (0.018)  (0.018) 
Probability of conviction -0.060***  -0.060*** 
 (0.018)  (0.018) 
Years of jail  0.002***  0.002*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
Probability of fine  0.104  0.111 
 (0.677)  (0.677) 
Unemployment -0.449  -0.453 
 (0.424)  (0.433) 
Unemployment^2 0.009  0.009 
 (0.013)  (0.013) 
Per capita income  0.009  0.011 
 (0.013)  (0.013) 
Per capita income^2  -0.002  -0.002 
 (0.002)  (0.003) 
Facilitated credit  -0.018  -0.017 
 (0.040)  (0.042) 
Per capita bank deposits  0.012*  0.012* 
 (0.006)  (0.006) 
School dropout rate  0.012  0.011 
 (0.013)  (0.011) 
Degree of infrastructures  0.293  0.296 
 (0.259)  (0.264) 
Population density  -0.012  -0.016 
 (0.005)  (0.007) 
Constant 0.061  0.059 
 (0.207)  (0.214) 
Observations 412  412 
R-squared 0.91  0.91 
 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
†   Hausman chi2(14) = 40.40     Sargan  chi2(2)=1.759   
†† Hausman chi2(14) = 40.12     Sargan  chi2(2)=1.684   




























Per-capita Income (Th. EUR.)
 †† 412  18.43  4.63  9.42  32.07 
Per-capita Facil. Credit (Th. EUR.)
†  412 0.67  0.37  0.18 2.00 
Per-capita Bank Loans (Th. EUR.)
 † 412 12.84  7.30  2.72 53.76 
High School Dropout Rate*  412  4.00  1.57  0.70  9.80 
Degree of Infrastructures*  412  0.11  0.04  0.04  0.25 
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First Instance+Preliminary Inv. 
 
2.38 3.01 3.58 
Court of Appeal  1.98 1.87 1.31 
 














Figure A1 – Distribution of Thefts every 1,000 inhabitants in Italy, 1999-2002 
 
 







Figure A2 – Distribution of Robberies every 1,000 inhabitants in Italy, 1999-2002 
 






Figure A3 – Distribution of Racketeering every 1,000 inhabitants in Italy, 1999-2002 
 
 







Figure A4 – Distribution of Frauds every 1,000 inhabitants in Italy, 1999-2002 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration on data provided by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) 